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CONCLUSION
Had I a right, for my own benefit, to inflict this curse
upon everlasting generations? . . . I shuddered to
think that future ages might curse me as their pest,
whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own
peace at the price perhaps of the existence of the
whole human race.1
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the New York Times interviewed Kelly Santos, a woman
suffering from a genetic chromosomal defect that caused a ninety
percent chance of miscarriage.2 After enduring six miscarriages and
undergoing six artificial inseminations and two in vitro fertilization
(IVF) treatments, Mrs. Santos gave birth to a healthy baby girl.3 In
1999, a girl suffering from Fanconi’s anemia received lifesaving stem
cells from her newborn sibling’s umbilical cord.4 In Chicago, Illinois,
1. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 129–30 (Susan J. Wolfson ed.,
2007).
2. Laurie Tarkan, Screening for Abnormal Embryos Offers Couples Hope After
Heartbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at F1.
3. Id.
4. Robert J. Boyle & Julian Savulescu, Ethics of Using Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis to Select a Stem Cell Donor for an Existing Person, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 1240,
1240 (2001).
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a little girl named Chloe Kingsbury was born; she will never suffer
from the genetically inherited form of colon cancer that killed her
grandmother, great-grandfather, and two uncles.5 All three of these
happy endings are the product of more than mere chance—each of
the babies involved had been purposely selected as an embryo using
IVF and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) treatments.6
In the early 1990s, doctors introduced the science of PGD, giving
prospective parents a chance to avoid giving birth to a child crippled
by a genetic disease.7 Today, however, PGD is used by parents who
want the ultimate element of control: control over their child’s ge-
netic makeup.8 Even now, twenty years later, the scientific commu-
nity has just begun to tap the potential of the science of creation.9
But as new discoveries arise, so too do new ethical and legal issues
as governments, doctors, and parents debate over what qualifies as
a “permissible” or “ethical” use of this technology.10 In each of the
factual cases illustrated above, the choice of whether to use PGD
was balanced against the probable pain and loss that would other-
wise result.11 The ethical dilemmas faced by each of these parents,
though still troubling, were less burdensome and more easily over-
come with the life or health of a child or the mother at stake.12
5. Amy Harmon, Couples Cull Embryos to Halt Heritage of Cancer, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2006, at 1.
6. For Kelly Santos, the doctors used PGD to select and implant an embryo without
the defective gene that caused the ninety percent rate of miscarriage. Tarkan, supra
note 2, at F1. The parents of the girl suffering from Fanconi’s anemia had IVF and PGD
for the purpose of providing a stem cell donor for their daughter. Boyle & Savulescu,
supra note 4, at 1240. Chloe was selected as an embryo using PGD to weed out embryos
carrying the cancer causing gene. Harmon, supra note 5, at 1.
7. Bergero v. Univ. S. Cal., 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 2835, at *4–5 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“[PGD] is intended to allow parents to avoid conceiving a child that will be born with a
particular genetic disorder.”); Karen Sermon et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,
363 LANCET 1633, 1633 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Darshak M. Sanghavi, M.D., Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some
Parents Choose Genetic Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at F5 (“[S]ome parents had the
painful and expensive fertility procedure for the express purpose of having children with
a defective gene.”).
9. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Designer Babies, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 64.
Lemonick explains:
Within a decade or two, it may be possible to screen kids almost before con-
ception for an enormous range of attributes, such as how tall they’re likely
to be, what body type they will have, their hair and eye color, what sorts of
illnesses they will be naturally resistant to, and even, conceivably, their IQ
and personality type.
Id.
10. See Boyce Rensberger, NIH Panel Looks at Ethics, Standards for Human Embryo
Research, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1994, at A3.
11. See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
12. E.g., Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
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Research relating to the science of reproduction or the attempt
to alter or control man’s genetic makeup has always inspired fear of
misuse, raising tricky ethical quandaries and religious fervor.13 The
PGD technique is no different; it evokes ethical concerns ranging from
the treatment of embryos as commodities, to its disquieting similarity
to eugenic abortion.14 Like stem cell and cloning research, many of
the fears about the use of PGD actually pertain to what the technol-
ogy might be able to do in the future rather than to its current use.15
There is little outcry about the more common use of PGD to screen
out fatal or crippling genetic diseases, disabilities, or aneuploidy.16
It seems few people object to preventing the birth of a child whose
quality of life will be drastically impaired by a genetic disease.17
The real public outcry arises when a prospective parent considers
using PGD to “design” a baby for reasons other than serious health
issues.18 The most common of these uses include selecting an embryo
with a genetic match to a sick sibling so that, at birth, the baby might
provide stem cells or bone marrow to that sibling, or to select the gen-
der of the child.19 Yet, despite the moral distaste or religious objec-
tions, neither of these uses of PGD will inherently result in physical
harm to the unborn child.20 Instead, the ethical quandaries arising
from the use of PGD stem from the possible negative societal conse-
quences, rather than because of any danger to the individual child.21
13. Scientists, specialists in the field, and other commentators question the moral
ambiguity of using PGD to create a new child for the sole purpose of saving another ex-
isting child. Boyle & Savulescu, supra note 4, at 1241. In the realm of fiction, there is a
plethora of cautionary tales about dystopias created through a misuse of genetic tech-
nology. See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD xviii (1946) (using literary fiction
to caution the world about the danger of scientifically altered human beings); GATTACA
(Columbia Pictures 1997) (painting a grim picture of a new class system resulting from
gene selection technology).
14. John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical
Debate: Ethical Issues in New Uses of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 18 HUMAN
REPROD. 465, 466 (2003); see, e.g., Rensberger, supra note 10, at A3 (illustrating the new
moral and ethical dilemmas arising from embryonic research and technology).
15. E.g., Lemonick, supra note 9, at 64 (discussing the fear that “parents may some-
day be able to go beyond weeding out undesirable traits and start actually inserting the
genes they want—perhaps even genes that have been crafted in a lab.”).
16. Robertson, supra note 14, at 465 (“[E]xcept for sex selection of the first child,
most current extensions of PGD are ethically acceptable.”).
17. See id. at 466.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 465.
20. But see Boyle & Savulescu, supra note 4, at 1241–42 (describing the emotional
damage to a child that could occur when parents decide to have another baby for the sole
purpose of saving an existing sibling).
21. See Harmon, supra note 5, at 20 (describing the fear that the expense of PGD could
result in “the first significant step toward a genetic class divide in which the wealthy
will become more genetically pure than the poor.”); Lemonick, supra note 9, at 66
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Today, advances in gene identification technology allow doctors
to use PGD to determine whether a child will carry the gene for cer-
tain types of deafness.22 Most hearing parents would, and do, use this
test to avoid having a deaf child.23 Whether a purpose of avoiding a
non-life-threatening condition is an ethical use of PGD is, in itself,
a contentious ethical issue.24 Yet, the real moral uncertainty arises
when a Deaf parent uses PGD to choose to implant an embryo with
the gene for deafness in order to intentionally give birth to a so-
called “disabled” child.25 This Note will argue that denying parents
the right to use PGD to implant an embryo based on a desire for
specific traits—particularly those commonly considered to be dis-
abilities, such as deafness—is a violation of the Constitutional right
to privacy, the right to refuse medical treatment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment due process protection of property. The rights of par-
ents and children and the limits of reproductive technology need to
be enumerated in the United States legal system, lest these rights
be trampled by individuals or lesser governments.
I. THE SCIENCE OF DESIGNING BABIES
PGD is currently inseparable from the increasingly popular IVF
treatment.26 IVF is a procedure by which female ova are removed
from the womb through a process called ovarian hyperstimulation.27
The ova are then fertilized with sperm in a test tube in a lab before
being placed into the womb.28 The procedure is both painful and
(foreseeing overuse of gender selection PGD technology and the resulting gender im-
balance in countries that prize males over females); Robertson, supra note 14, at 469
(discussing the possibility of an expansion of sexism and gender discrimination due to
PGD gender selection).
22. Steve Connor, Deaf Parents Could Choose to Have Deaf Children, INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 21, 2000, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deaf-parents-could-choose-to
-have-deaf-children-699096.html. There are several types of inborn deafness; the type
selected by PGD is a nonsyndromic form of deafness caused by a GJB2 or GJB6 gene
mutation. Gheona Altarescu et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) for Nonsyn-
dromic Deafness by Polar Body and Blastomere Biopsy, 26 J. ASSIST. REPROD. GENET.
391, 392 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2758950/pdf
/10815_2009_Article_9335.pdf.
23. See Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5.
24. See Harmon, supra note 5, at 1 (questioning the use of PGD to select for non-fatal
diseases or conditions with uncertain effects, such as selecting an embryo to avoid the prob-
ability rather than an absolute certainty that a child will get cancer in later life); Lemonick,
supra note 9, at 66 (illustrating the danger of overselecting or “designing” children).
25. See Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5.
26. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), THE FERTILITY INSTITUTES, http://www
.fertility-docs.com/PGD.phtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
27. Sermon et al., supra note 7, at 1633.
28. Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5.
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expensive, resulting in costs that can reach tens of thousands of
dollars.29 The first successful birth from IVF occurred in England on
July 26, 1978.30 Although originally greeted with moral outrage and
hesitation, the IVF procedure has since rapidly increased in popu-
larity due to its use in countering infertility and aiding couples at
risk of passing on genetic diseases.31 In 2009, for example, IVF
treatment led to 45,870 live births and 60,190 infants in the United
States alone.32
Once the embryos are created in vitro, the doctor will use PGD,
an “early form of prenatal diagnosis, in which embryos . . . are
analysed for well-defined genetic defects.” 33 After the embryos’ gen-
etic makeup has been analyzed, those embryos with the desired gen-
etic makeup, or without a genetic defect, are then placed into the
womb.34 The initial goal of PGD is “to give prospective parents the
‘opportunity’ of giving birth to a healthy child.” 35 Doctors in London
performed the first successful PGD procedure on humans in 1989.36
The technology has been improved and refined over the past twenty
years with doctors using PGD to screen for more and more types of
genes.37 Currently, PGD technology has the ability to determine the
presence of one hundred different genetic conditions in all, including
gender, hair and eye color, sex linked diseases, late onset diseases
such as genetically linked cancers and Alzheimer’s Disease, tissue
type for stem cell matching, dwarfism, and certain types of deafness.38
29. Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
30. The first babies born using IVF were nicknamed “test tube babies” and the pro-
cedure was titled in vitro, which literally means “in glass” due to the manner of their
unique conception. Myra MacPherson, The Doctor and the ‘Test Tube Baby,’ WASH. POST,
Oct. 12, 1978, at D1.
31. See Lemonick, supra note 9, at 64, 66 (“ ‘When the world first learned about IVF
two decades ago’ . . . ‘it was horrifying to most people, and most said that they wouldn’t
use it even if they were infertile. But growing demand makes it socially acceptable . . . .’ ”
(quoting biologist Lee Silver)); Sermon et al., supra note at 7, 1633.
32. 2009 Assisted Reproductive Technology Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2009/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
33. Sermon et al., supra note 7, at 1633; Boyle & Savulescu, supra note 4, at 1240
(PGD is the “genetic analysis of artificially fertilised embryos to select an embryo with
a desired genotype before it is implanted.”). The actual process involves a biopsy of one
to two cells in a six to eight cell embryo or the first and second polar bodies of an oocyte.
The genetic material from these cells is then analyzed for the desired traits. Altarescu
et al., supra note 22, at 391–92.
34. Sermon et al., supra note 7, at 1633.
35. Bartha M. Knoppers & Rosario M. Isasi, Regulatory Approaches to Reproductive
Genetic Testing, 19 HUM. REPROD. 2695, 2696 (2004).
36. Tarkan, supra note 2, at F6.
37. Id.
38. TANIA M. SIMONCELLI, INT’L CTR. FOR TECH. ASSESSMENT, PRE-IMPLANTATION
GENETIC DIAGNOSIS: ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 3–6 (2003);
Sangavi supra note 8, at F5; Tarkan, supra note 2, at F6.
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Without PGD and other in vitro processes, parents at risk of
passing on genetic diseases to their unborn offspring would have to
rely on Prenatal Diagnosis (PND).39 PND involves testing an already
developing fetus in the womb.40 If the fetus is found to have a ge-
netic condition, the parents are left with two terrible options: “to
either . . . terminate the pregnancy . . . or continue with the preg-
nancy and prepare for the future knowing that the child will be born
with a genetic condition.” 41 For potential parents who might other-
wise suffer the pain of losing a child to a severe and often fatal gen-
etic disease or undergoing the psychological turmoil of terminating
a pregnancy, PGD is “nothing short of miraculous.” 42
Aside from the moral implications, the only thing preventing a
greater percentage of the population from “designing” their children
using PGD is the expense and the taxing physical process of IVF.43
Most uses of PGD, therefore, involve prospective parents at risk for
serious genetic conditions.44 Yet, as PGD and its fellow screening
techniques increase in fame, more and more couples are opting to do
IVF and PGD or similar techniques, including Florescence in situ
Hybridization (FISH), to select the gender of their child or to avoid
diseases that are merely likely instead of one hundred percent cer-
tain to occur.45 In a survey of 190 United States PGD clinics, only
three percent of those clinics reported using PGD “to select an em-
bryo for the presence of a disability.” 46
II. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF PGD
Most developed countries, particularly those with a western
society influence, have enacted regulations to control the use of, or
research in, reproductive technology—particularly the permissibility
or extent of the use of PGD.47 These regulatory systems are difficult
to generalize because each country regulates based on their own
unique legal systems and the “cultural and socio-religious beliefs
which inform and shape public policy on assisted reproductive
39. See Sermon et al., supra note 7, at 1633.
40. Knopper & Isasi, supra note 35, at 2696.
41. Id.
42. Tarkan, supra note 2, at F6.
43. Robertson, supra note 14, at 465–66; Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
44. Robertson, supra note 14, at 465–66; Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
45. See J.C. Harper & D. Wells, Recent Advances and Future Developments in PGD,
19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1193, 1193–98 (1999); see also Harmon, supra note 5, at 20 (detail-
ing a couple’s decision to utilize PGD on discovering the husband’s genetic predisposition
towards colon cancer).
46. Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5.
47. SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2.
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technologies and genetic testing.” 48 Certain leading countries, includ-
ing Australia, Germany, Austria, and Ireland, issued a blanket pro-
hibition on all uses of the procedure when PGD initially developed.49
Only recently have some of these countries loosened their laws on
PGD, if only slightly.50 Neighboring countries, including France, Italy,
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have
chosen “to limit the use of PGD to a narrow range of applications,
and in some cases, . . . establish a process for considering future appli-
cation of the technology.” 51
The United Kingdom, for example, created the Human Fertili-
sation and Embryology Authority Regulatory Committee to control
and oversee the research and use of reproductive technology.52 This
committee evolved after the enactment of the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act of 1990, a comprehensive set of rules and reg-
ulations regarding the use of IVF, PGD, and related technology.53 Due
to the nationalization of the health care systems in countries like
Canada and Britain, restricting and dictating the permissible uses
of genetic enhancement or selection is easier.54 Because the majority
of the health care system in the United States is not managed by the
government, there will always be “people with enough money . . . to
pay for what they want.” 55
A. Regulation of PGD in the United States
The United States has no regulation or oversight control over
much of the fertility industry, particularly the private use of PGD.56
Decisions regarding which embryos may be implanted and which
diseases a doctor may screen for are left almost entirely to a doctor’s
discretion.57 The United States government seems to be hesitant to
48. Knopper & Isasi, supra note 35, at 2695.
49. SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2.
50. For example, Germany passed a law in July 2011 creating an exception to the
Embryo Protection Act 1990, which banned PGD completely. Nishat Hyder, Germany
Allows PGD for Life-Threatening Genetic Defects, BIONEWS (July 11, 2011), http://www
.bionews.org.uk/page_101402.asp. The exception only narrowly passed in the legislature
and still allows PGD only if parents have a predisposition to a serious genetic illness,
whereupon the parents must still undergo counseling and be approved by an ethics
panel. Id.
51. SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2.
52. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, §§ 5, 8 (Eng.).
53. Knoppers & Isasi, supra note 35, at 2700.
54. Lemonick, supra note 9, at 66.
55. Id.
56. SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2.
57. See also, e.g., Harmon, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing the expense and currently
limited popularity of PGD).
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enact restricting legislation.58 This is perhaps because of issues with
the status of embryos.59 Another possibility is that because current
use of PGD is rare, the inevitably contentious debate would seem to
be a waste of time.60 This means that, currently, parents can choose
to implant an embryo that they know possesses the genetic muta-
tion causing nonsyndromic deafness.61
The danger is that without any federal enumerated law in the
United States, the individual states could step up to fill the gap,
choosing to follow a similarly restrictive legislative path as countries
like the United Kingdom.62 Clause 14 of the United Kingdom’s Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Bill of 2007–2008 prohibits pre-
ferring embryos at risk of developing “serious physical or mental
disability” or “serious illness” to embryos where there is no such
risk.63 Although not specifically enumerated in the bill, in the
Official Explanatory Notes and during proceedings in the House of
Lords, deafness has been specified as one of the prohibited selected-
for disabilities in the Act.64 If the views of the majority in the United
States are any indication, state law, particularly in conservative
states, could become more restrictive on permissive uses of PGD and
how much control a parent has over their embryos, particularly ban-
ning the selection of embryos with a gene for deafness.65
The closest the United States government has come to regulat-
ing the use of PGD and similar treatments is in its regulation of
federal funding for embryonic research and experimentation.66 The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines for funding, also
called the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, bars funding for human em-
bryonic research or experimentation “in which a human embryo or
58. SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2.
59. See, e.g., Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160–61 (4th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the diffi-
cult concept of what status an embryo holds in our society for the purposes of legal rights).
60. See SIMONCELLI, supra note 38, at 2–4.
61. See also id. at 2 (“[A] virtually unregulated fertility industry has been left to offer
any and all available PGD applications to its clients.”).
62. Knoppers & Isasi, supra note 35, at 2695, 2698.
63. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, 2007–08, H.L. Bill [6] cl. 14 (U.K.).
64. Ailsa Stevens, Debating Deafness and Embryo Selection: Are We Undermining
Reproductive Confidence in the Deaf Community?, BIONEWS (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www
.bionews.org.uk/page_37988.asp.
65. See also, e.g., Marie Arana-Ward, As Technology Advances, a Bitter Debate Divides
the Deaf, WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at A1 (citing the conflict between the Deaf com-
munity’s views on deafness and those of the hearing world); Harmon, supra note 5, at 20
(citing the distaste of PGD felt by anti-abortion groups and those who support embryo
rights); Lemonick, supra note 9, at 64 (discussing the negative views most of the public
feel towards genetic engineering).
66. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, §509, 123 Stat
3034, 3280–81 (2009); see Sherley v. Sebelius, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011).
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embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of
injury or death.” 67
At first glance, the effect of this amendment on the use of PGD
seems minimal. After all, the purpose of PGD seems to match up with
the permitted experimentation in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment:
to “meet the health needs of the fetus or enhance the probability of
its survival to viability” by selecting healthy embryos.68 Despite this
argument, the court in Sherley v. Sebelius used PGD as an example
of a type of research that would be prohibited from receiving federal
funding.69 The court reasoned that although the purpose of PGD is
not to destroy a human embryo, there is a risk of injury or death
which springs naturally from such treatment.70 Part of the logic be-
hind this conclusion may be based on the likely termination of the
embryos not selected using PGD because they contain a genetic
defect.71 Unlike couples who use IVF for infertility and who may
store several embryos for a later, additional child,72 parents who use
PGD to avoid a genetic defect or disease are unlikely to request
storage for affected embryos.73
The conclusion reached in Sherley does not affect the ability of
parents or researchers to utilize PGD;74 it just forbids the use of fed-
eral funds to do so.75 The harm resulting from Sherley and the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment stems from the implied government disapproval
of embryonic research and treatments, including PGD. This disap-
proval could be used by states to limit not just government funding,
but the actual application of PGD. On a positive front, President
Obama recently expanded the approved types of embryonic research.76
67. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 509(2).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 289g (2006).
69. Sherley, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
70. Id.
71. See Rebecca Knox, Note, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Disease Control or
Child Objectification?, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 435, 441 (2003).
72. Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive
Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 465 (2006).
73. See also Knox, supra note 71, at 436 (stating that only those embryos determined
to be unaffected by the genetic disease or defect in question are to be used and implanted).
74. Sherley, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (holding only that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment
forbids the federal funding of PGD research without mentioning the legality of the re-
search itself).
75. Id. at 18.
76. President Obama ordered:
Research involving human embryonic stem cells and human non-embryonic
stem cells has the potential to lead to better understanding and treatment
of many disabling diseases and conditions. Advances over the past decade
in this promising scientific field have been encouraging, leading to broad
agreement in the scientific community that the research should be sup-
ported by Federal funds.
Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2009).
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Although not directly applicable to PGD, this marks a step towards
further exploration and openness to new treatments.77
B. Wrongful Life
Under New York law “a child does not have a fundamental right
to be born free of genetic defects, regardless of how the child was
conceived.” 78 This holding has been applied most frequently to de-
termine “wrongful life” suits.79 Wrongful life refers to a case in which
a parent is suing the doctor or hospital for negligent use of PGD or
for the failure of PGD to prevent a genetic disease.80 For example,
in Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction, the plaintiff,
the parents of a child born with cystic fibrosis, sued the doctors who
had “manipulated the embryonic material [that] was implanted”
into her womb through IVF and PGD.81 The plaintiff’s argument
was that the doctor defendants were “negligent in failing to test the
egg, sperm and embryo before implantation,” specifically, failing to
test the donor egg using PGD or to screen the plaintiff father for a
genetic risk of cystic fibrosis.82 The plaintiffs also argued that the
doctors failed to obtain the “proper informed consent . . . about the
potential for cystic fibrosis.” 83 Despite these claims, the court held
for the defendant doctors under the theory that the doctor’s respon-
sibility did not extend so far as to prevent a child from being born
with any one of a myriad of disabilities.84
Similarly, the court in Paretta also refused to allow the plain-
tiffs to recover for emotional distress caused by the birth of a child
with a genetic disease.85 On this matter, the court does not differen-
tiate between a birth via IVF and PGD and a natural birth: “[t]his
Court cannot treat the emotional distress and psychic pain suffered
by parents who give birth to a sick child after in-vitro fertilization
any differently from that sustained by other parents.” 86 The impli-
cations of Paretta on the use of PGD to purposely select for deafness
are clear. If a child has no fundamental right to be born without a
77. Id.
78. Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
79. See, e.g., D. D. v. Idant Labs., 374 F. App’x 319, 324 (3d Cir. 2010); Andrews v.
Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 368 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
80. Kate Wevers, Note, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 265 (2010).
81. Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 645–46.
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id.
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disability,87 parents and their doctor are not violating any inherent
right of a child by using PGD to choose deafness prior to birth. By
treating PGD and natural birth equally,88 the court is eliminating
the difference between an embryo with the gene for deafness that was
naturally implanted, and the embryo with the gene for deafness that
was chosen purposely for implantation out of other healthy embryos
which would have had an equal chance of being born otherwise.
III. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Similar to stem cell research debates, much of the argument
about legal uses of PGD and other fertility treatments result from
the need to interpret the Constitution to deal with issues that were
well beyond the scope of the Framers’ imaginations. Whether a par-
ent could choose their child’s genetic makeup was not even consid-
ered an issue existing outside of science fiction until very recently.89
For the purposes of PGD and the rights of parents, looking to the
right to privacy as enumerated in case law spanning from the early
twentieth century to abortion law is more pertinent.90
The Supreme Court solidified the right to privacy in the 1973
abortion case, Roe v. Wade.91 Roe is famous for its stance on abortion
rights, holding that a Texas law which criminalized abortion at any
stage, except to preserve the life of the mother, was unconstitu-
tional.92 Yet, the ramifications for the Constitutional right of pri-
vacy spread far beyond the right to an abortion.93 The Court held
that although “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy . . . the Court has recognized that a right of person-
al privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution.” 94 The liberties protected under the
right of privacy include: the right to procreation, upheld in Skinner
v. Oklahoma,95 the right to contraception, guaranteed in Eisenstadt
v. Baird,96 and the right to “child rearing and education” from Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.97 The Court draws this right from the First
87. Paretta, N.Y.S.2d at 644.
88. Id. at 646.
89. Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5.
90. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 530 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923).
91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 114.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 152–53.
94. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
95. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942)).
96. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972)).
97. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
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Amendment,98 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,99 the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights,100 the Ninth Amendment,101 and the “concept of
liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”102 The result in Roe being that a mother has the Constitu-
tional right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester.103
The right to select which embryo to implant in one’s own womb
must be implied from the right to decide whether or not to have an
embryo in one’s womb: i.e., whether to abort a fetus. If the State has
no right to demand that a woman abort a disabled child,104 the State
should have no right to interfere with a woman choosing to initiate
a pregnancy with the knowledge and intent that the child will be
born with a disorder.105
Meyer v. Nebraska enumerates the right to establish a home
and to raise children.106 The practice at issue in Meyer was merely
whether a parent has a right to educate their children as they see
fit: namely, whether a law banning the teaching of a foreign lan-
guage in schools was unconstitutional.107 The Court held that:
“[L]iberty” denotes[ ] not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a
home, and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.108
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, two private schools sued
the Governor of Oregon to invalidate the Compulsory Education Act
of 1922 which required all parents or guardians to enroll their
children in public schools instead of private school.109 The Court
extended the right to privacy to include the right to raise children
as a parent or guardian sees fit.110
98. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
99. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
100. Id. at 152 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965)).
101. Id. at 129 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
102. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
103. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
104. See id.
105. Connor, supra note 22.
106. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
110. Id. at 532.
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Government control over which embryo a parent may choose to
implant “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of children under their con-
trol.”111 If a deaf parent chooses to have a deaf child, that is their
choice and right as a parent, making a decision that they feel is best
for their future child.112 The right to choose whether to have chil-
dren, how many children to have, and how to raise those children
are all within the rights of the parent or guardian.113 Why then
would the right to determine which embryos a parent may or may
not choose to raise fall under the State’s purview, rather than the
rights of the parents?
States are not allowed to interfere with the right to privacy
“under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative ac-
tion which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some pur-
pose within the competency of the state to effect.”114 States do have
the compelling state interest in protecting a child’s health and well-
being.115 Child abuse, for example, is a classic instance when the
state may interfere in a person’s parenting.116 Selecting a naturally
occurring embryo for certain genetic makeup for a child does not fall
within the parameters of child abuse.117 The simplest defense being
that an embryo is not a child.118
According to Roe v. Wade, “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”119 Therefore, an
embryo has no rights under the Constitution.120 Instead, it is the
parents who have the right to determine what happens to those em-
bryos; they can choose to implant them, dispose of them, sell them,
donate them, or store them.121 Current debates about embryo disposal
111. Id. at 534–35.
112. See also id. at 535 (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to rec-
ognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
113. See id.
114. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“[R]ights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reason-
able relation to some purpose within the competency of the state.”).
115. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 158 (1973).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (prohibiting sexual abuse or exploitation of children); 42
U.S.C. § 5106a (2006) (dictating when the federal government may make a monetary grant
to a State for programs to prevent or investigate incidents of child abuse and neglect).
117. See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (upholding the right of parents to raise their
child as they see fit).
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 2011).
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and ownership have been relegated to the realm of property law
rather than human rights.122 In determining that there is no consid-
eration for the health of a first trimester fetus,123 abortion case law
has therefore determined that there is no consideration for the
lesser status of an embryo.124 The issue is that these embryos,
unlike those in abortion cases, are intended to develop into babies
with rights who will suffer the consequences of any misuse or un-
ethical treatment.
A. Compelling State Interest: The Child’s Best Interests
Because an embryo chosen by PGD is intended to be carried to
term and born to the rights under the Constitution, the issue of
whether a parent may purposely choose to “disable” their child may
stretch beyond ordinary abortion law. The issue would then turn on
whether the state has a compelling interest to protect the health of
a future child.125
The intentional selection of an embryo because it possesses the
gene for a disability like deafness has been met with disgust and
moral outrage.126 Most people view purposely choosing a deaf child
as a “very real conflict between parental desires and the welfare of
the child.”127 An online magazine called this practice akin to “the
deliberate crippling of children.”128 Yet, it is not child abuse to raise
a child in the Deaf culture.129 Nor is it child abuse to deny a deaf
child a cochlear implant or hearing aids, both of which would result
in, essentially, “creating” a deaf child.130 To understand why a
parent would purposely choose to inflict a condition that is normally
considered a disability on a child, one must first understand the
Deaf culture.
122. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 158.
125. See, e.g., id. at 114 (citing the compelling state interest of preserving human life
and health).
126. Connor, supra note 22 (“[W]ide-scale introduction of pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) will raise the prospect of disadvantaged babies being born who will be
deliberately chosen to be disabled for the benefit of their parents.”).
127. Id. (quoting Professor Allan Templeton).
128. Sanghavi, supra note 8, at F5 (quoting Slate Magazine).
129. The right to raise a child in the Deaf culture is a choice that falls clearly within
the right to raise one’s children as one sees fit as established by Pierce. See, e.g., Pierce
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
130. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990) (citing the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
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B. Understanding Deaf Culture
Deaf with a capital “D” describes the culture of hearing impaired
people who communicate with sign language.131 This culture is de-
fined by its own language, history, and the “shared sense of isola-
tion from the hearing world.”132 In the United States, Deaf people
generally communicate using American Sign Language (ASL) which
uses visual cues, such as “hand shape, position and movement, plus
posture, [and] facial expressions” in order to communicate.133 Though
many deaf people learn to speak and to read lips—particularly those
with only slight hearing loss or those who lost their hearing at
an advanced age—Deaf people view sign language as their “na-
tive” language, which they utilize to create their own poetry, art,
and expression.134
Several members of the Deaf community, along with certain
sociologists, psychologists, and doctors, would argue that it is in the
child’s best interest to allow deaf parents to choose to have deaf
children.135 The arguments used by the Supreme Court to justify their
holding in Roe v. Wade are the same used to justify the right of Deaf
parents to choose to implant an embryo carrying the gene for deaf-
ness.136 For example, Roe justifies its holding by referring to the psy-
chological and social damage involved in raising an unwanted child:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent . . . . Mater-
nity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.137
This reasoning mirrors the distress that could occur in families
where the child is excluded from his parent’s culture because of his
genetic makeup.138 Deaf parents, particularly those imbued in the
131. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A1.
132. Carina Dennis, Genetics: Deaf by Design, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC’Y (Oct. 20,
2004), http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=1516.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Connor, supra note 22.
136. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170–71 (1973).
137. Id.
138. Connor, supra note 22.
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Deaf culture, believe that a hearing child would be alienated from
his home environment.139 Such alienation could result in harmful
effects to both the child and his parents.140
Members and supporters of the Deaf community argue that
deafness is so mild a disability that being deaf is “in the long-term
interests of the child . . . so that they will share the same experi-
ences as their affected parents.”141 A hearing person, even family
members of deaf people, are often unable to breach the barriers be-
tween them and their deaf relative despite knowing sign language.142
A deaf child born into a deaf family would share his or her parents’
culture, language, and their “birthright of silence”—connections that
a hearing child could never share.143
A fitting comparison often made by Deaf activists is that “[t]rying
to ‘fix’ a deaf child . . . is like trying to fix someone because he or she
speaks Japanese.”144 Whether those outside the Deaf culture think
it is a disadvantage or not, the right to teach a child a foreign lan-
guage is inherent in the right to raise one’s children as one sees fit
that is included in the right to privacy.145 Culturally Deaf people do
not believe they suffer from a disability.146 They view themselves as
a separate community, and many parents want to share that com-
munity with their children, just as other parents do their religious
or ethnic backgrounds.147 The State has no compelling state interest
in denying parents the right to share their cultural background, tra-
ditions, and language with their child.
IV. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
a variety of rights under the right to privacy as discussed in Part II of
this Note.148 The protection guaranteed under the Due Process Clause,
however, extends to protect a vast number of individual liberties149
from “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Dennis, supra note 132.
143. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A20.
144. Id.
145. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923).
146. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A20.
147. Id.; see Natalie Angier, Baby in a Box, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at SM86 (ex-
pressing the generally held truth that all parents want to see something of themselves
in their children).
148. See supra Part II.
149. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
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procedures used to implement them.”150 One of these protected lib-
erties is the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.151 In Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the parents of an incom-
petent woman in a permanent vegetative state sought permission
from the courts for the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from their daughter.152 While the Court held that the appellant par-
ents could not withdraw treatment in this case, they did recognize
the Constitutional right of competent persons to refuse any medical
treatment, even to the extent of costing them their lives.153
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment and PGD
This right to refuse medical treatment extends to parents choos-
ing to exclude their children from medical treatment under the right
to raise one’s children as one sees fit.154 This right only extends to
non-life-sustaining treatments unless the parent refuses under the
Constitutional right to freedom of religion.155 Under this standard,
it is likely that a court could refuse to uphold a parent’s choice to im-
plant an embryo that suffered from a severe or fatal genetic disease.
Nonsyndromic deafness, however, is not a fatal condition.156 Many
would further argue that deafness is not even a severe condition
since a deaf child could live almost as ordinary a life as a hearing
child.157 If parents using IVF have the right to select healthy em-
bryos to implant in the womb, the Deaf and other mildly disabled
parents should expect the same right to select embryos carrying
their own genetic disorder.158
In many states the doctor who implements PGD treatment is
required by law to “consider, prior to treatment, the welfare of any
child that might be born.”159 Many doctors, therefore, refuse to im-
plant embryos affected by the gene for deafness or other slight dis-
abilities, like dwarfism, despite the parent’s wishes.160 The idea of
150. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
152. Id. at 265.
153. Id. at 279.
154. Emily Catalano, Comment, Healing or Homicide?: When Parents Refuse Medical
Treatment for Their Children on Religious Grounds, 18 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y
157, 169 (2009–2010).
155. Id. at 162.
156. See Altarescu et al., supra note 22, at 394.
157. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A20.
158. Connor, supra note 22.
159. Id.
160. See id.; Solveig Magnus Reindal, Disability, Gene Therapy and Eugenics—A
Challenge to John Harris, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 89, 90 (2000).
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creating a child with a disability seems likely to inspire fear of fu-
ture regret and lawsuits.161 Many doctors have suffered in the civil
courts because their use of PGD to choose healthy children failed.162
This, at least, is a problem that is easily solved. For a doctor to protect
himself or herself from liability in the absence of negligence, all that
is necessary is for the doctor to give the patient “informed consent”163
and to fulfill the doctor’s “fiduciary duty to disclose facts material
to the patient’s consent.”164 Yet, by requiring the doctor to take special,
extra precautions when implanting an embryo, these state laws sub-
stantially affect a parent’s right to privacy and the right to refuse
medical treatment and are therefore unconstitutional.165
A legally competent adult also has the right, “in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to
lawful medical treatment.”166 This rule implies the right of a mother
to have her embryos tested for genetic disabilities and then refuse to
exclude the embryos with the disability. The result of a doctor choos-
ing to go ahead with implanting only the embryos without the dis-
abilities violates the right of the mother to choose whether to submit
to lawful medical treatment.167 Furthermore, certain states have held
it against public policy to enforce prior decisions in the “highly per-
sonal area of reproductive choice” if one of the parents changes his or
her mind.168 The government has enumerated the right to control one’s
own body in Roe, Cruzan, and Moore;169 there is no more personal de-
cision regarding one’s body than whether to bear a certain child.
B. Cochlear Implants
Most Deaf people take advantage of the right to refuse medical
treatment by refusing to make use of the recent technological break-
through in hearing repair: the cochlear implant.170 In fact, when the
cochlear implant was first developed, it was met with “hostility and
161. See Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 647–48 (Sup.
Ct. 2003).
162. Id.
163. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
164. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
165. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–55, 162–65 (1973) (holding that any
obstacles created by a state that substantially interfere with the right to an abortion—
the right to privacy—are unconstitutional).
166. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 242 (Cal. 1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
167. See id.
168. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).
169. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990); Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
170. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A20.
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dismay” by a majority of Deaf individuals.171 The cochlear implant
is “a surgically implanted device used by severe to profoundly deaf
individuals who receive minimal benefit from hearing aids.”172 The
implants repair the damage done to the inner ear and the cochlear.173
At the minimum, a cochlear implant can give a deaf child access to
the sounds of his or her environment, such as loud crashes, alarms,
and car horns.174 Particularly successful cases result in a deaf child
who can successfully interact in the “mainstream oral world.”175
Health care providers do not have to supplement cochlear im-
plants, and many do not supplement them or pay for the operation.176
No laws require parents to implant a cochlear implant in their deaf
child’s brain despite the fact that some proponents claim that it “cures”
deafness.177 Parents can choose to keep their child deaf under the
right to raise children, as enumerated in the right to privacy178 and
the right to refuse medical treatment.179 The difference between the
choice of parents to keep their child deaf and the choice to purposely
make their child deaf through PGD is a negligible distinction. No
matter which road a parent takes—refusing the cochlear implant or
purposely implanting an embryo with the gene for deafness—the
child will grow up deaf, which, as demonstrated, is not illegal.
V. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
The Court in Roe v. Wade determined that prior to birth an em-
bryo or fetus does not qualify as a person for the purposes of the
Constitution, particularly in regards to the rights and protections
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Embryos have nei-
ther legally protected rights nor the standing to pursue a claim.181
171. Robert Sparrow, Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear Implants, 13 J.
POL. PHIL. 135, 135 (2005).
172. A.U. ex rel. N.U. v. Roane Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (E.D.
Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id.
174. Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A1.
175. Id.
176. See A.U., 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1143–44.
177. But see Arana-Ward, supra note 65, at A20.
178. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (enumerating the right to raise
children and establish a home).
179. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (enumerating the
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment).
180. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co.,
7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998).
181. Doe v. Sebelius, 676 F. Supp. 2d 423, 429 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Doe v.
Obama, 631 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Following this reasoning, a logical conclusion is that the embryos
are merely the property of their parents until viability under Roe.182
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution forbids any state
from making a law that deprives citizens of “life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”183 If a court determines that em-
bryos are property, states may make no law depriving citizens of the
right to do with their property as they see fit.184 In fact, embryos
have a unique standing under the law, qualifying neither as “people”
nor as “property.”185 Yet, for the purpose of legal disputes, courts have
often found it necessary to treat embryos like property while applying
an almost meaningless “special respect” for the well-being of the em-
bryo based on its potential for human life.186 Biological parents of a
fertilized embryo have an ownership interest in the embryo, similar
to a property interest.187 In cases involving the wrongful destruction
or harm of an embryo, courts will base their findings on the “economic
losses” suffered by the prospective parents rather than emotional dis-
tress that might occur from the loss of a child.188 Because of this legal
standing, parents are free to dispose of their unused embryos as they
see fit, notwithstanding any state specific regulations.189 If a parent
is allowed to dispose of an embryo, that parent can also choose to
implant that embryo, regardless of its genetic makeup.190
VI. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT
POLITICAL CLIMATE ON THE USE OF PGD
Today’s major political battles relating to reproduction technol-
ogy and rights are almost entirely focused on proliferating or elimi-
nating abortion rights.191 PGD barely generates the occasional news
182. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. See id.
185. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; see also In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 836,
840–41 (Or. App. 2008) (including a couple’s fertilized embryos in the pool of marital
property to be distributed upon the dissolution of the marriage).
186. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
187. Id.
188. Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1998).
189. See In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836 (holding as valid a contract signed
by the parents of six frozen embryos which allowed the clinic to dispose of the embryos
upon request).
190. See id.; Reindal, supra note 160, at 90.
191. See, e.g., Editorial, The ‘Personhood’ Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, at A30;
Jessica Valenti, How an Anti-Abortion Push to Redefine ‘Person’ Could Hurt Women’s
Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-an
-anti-abortion-push-to-redef ine-person-could-wind-up-hurting-women/2011/10/26
/gIQAQSwGQM_story.html.
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article or minor protest because many people are still unaware of
the variety of options in modern reproduction.192 Ten years ago, ex-
perts predicted a rise in the use of PGD to eliminate genetic diseases,
chances of late onset cancers, to choose a child’s gender, and much
more as the technology was refined further.193 Yet, although IVF has
gained fame and popularity,194 most people are still unaware that
PGD technology and the options it provides to prospective parents
are more than science fiction.195
Ironically, without even intending the consequences,196 the anti-
abortion movement stands to limit or excise the right to implement
PGD screening methods.197 A recent change in tactics among anti-
abortion movements has resulted in a proliferation of “Personhood”
laws: state laws that define a person’s life and rights as beginning at
conception.198 In Mississippi, a ballot asked voters to decide whether
life begins at conception, i.e., in the embryonic stage.199 In Wiscon-
sin, Ohio, Florida, and Colorado similar bills or ballots have been
brought to the public forum.200 Such laws are meant to criminalize
abortions and most types of emergency birth control.201 The result-
ing ripple effect goes much wider than the legislators or lobbyists
probably considered.202
For “Personhood” supporters, i.e., those who believe that life be-
gins at conception, PGD is nearly, if not equally, as unacceptable as
abortion.203 By giving fertilized embryos the same rights as people,
abortion rights won’t be the only rights affected.204 Stem cell research,
treatment for ectopic pregnancies, PGD, and IVF would all be pro-
hibited.205 IVF treatment could be determined an illegal practice
192. Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
193. Connor, supra note 22.
194. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012).
195. Harmon, supra note 5, at 20.
196. Editorial, supra note 191.
197. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the debate over personhood statutes could severely
limit or outlaw fertility treatments); Valenti, supra note 191 (discussing the negative im-
pact a personhood statute would have on women’s rights, including fertility treatment).
198. Valenti, supra note 191.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The ‘Personhood’ Initiative, supra note 191; see also, Harmon, supra note 5, at 20
(“P.G.D. is as unethical as abortion and perhaps more pernicious because it is psycho-
logically less burdensome.”).
203. Valenti, supra note 191.
204. Editorial, supra note 191.
205. See Laura Bassett, ‘Personhood’ Anti-Abortion Movement Gains National
Momentum, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/11/08/personhood-abortion-bans-_n_1082344.html (“You can’t propose a ballot mea-
sure that encompasses more than a single subject . . . . In trying to ban abortion, ban
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because more than half of those newly designated “people” would
never even have the chance to be born and would face storage or
disposal.206 The personhood bills would bridge the gap between PGD
and eugenic abortion, requiring women to give birth to a child who
may only live a few pain-filled months after birth due to a crippling
genetic disease.207
Thus far, these personhood laws have been defeated in every
state.208 Several key pro-life associations have even declined to sup-
port them.209 In 2011, the ACLU and Planned Parenthood preemp-
tively filed lawsuits against the Personhood initiative in Nevada to
send a message to try and halt the spread of this movement to other
states.210 Yet, as popularity for this pro-life strategy grows, the danger
that such a law might pass increases.211 If passed, such a law would
almost definitely be declared unconstitutional due to its direct op-
position to the holding in Roe v. Wade.212 This political atmosphere
makes enumeration of PGD and genetic screening rights more impor-
tant than ever in order to preserve them from any collateral damage
resulting from the abortion battle.
CONCLUSION
In 2002, a Deaf lesbian couple in the United States caused a stir
by “designing” a deaf child.213 Although the couple did not use PGD,
the outrage over purposely seeking a sperm donor with a genetic
history of deafness resounded internationally.214 Yet no legal conse-
quences arose from the birth of their deaf son.215 While critics claim
that the act of designing children “depersonalises human procre-
ation and treats children as mere products,” 216 the search for further
treatment for ectopic pregnancies, ban stem cell research, ban IVF, these measures
clearly encompass more than one subject.”) (quoting Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, an ACLU
attorney working on the lawsuits challenging personhood initiatives in Nevada).
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control over one’s offspring does not originate with the development
of PGD, as evidenced by the Deaf lesbian couple.217
A vast majority of parents want their children to possess those
genetic traits that they value most in themselves.218 Parents want
to look at their child and see something familiar—whether it be hair
color, the shape of a face, race, or, in the case of certain disabled peo-
ple, evidence of their own disability.219 If Deaf people view their dis-
ability as a cultural distinction, almost a separate ethnicity, it is not
unnatural for them to want to pass on that culture, that way of life,
to their children. People have been exercising genetic choice over
their children long before the advent of PGD in the selection of their
partner simply by choosing a mate within the same religion, race,
culture, or disability group.220 This freedom of choice is one of those
“privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 221 Why, then, should a line
be drawn between a natural chance to have a disabled child and tak-
ing naturally occurring embryos and upping the odds of having a
disabled child?
James Watson, co-discoverer of the DNA structure, was quoted
as saying: “I don’t believe we can let the government start dictating
the decisions people make about what sorts of families they’ll have.” 222
As demonstrated in the abortion rights issue and the “Personhood”
movement, there has always been a struggle to determine whose
right it is to control certain aspects of our bodies. Those personally
affected—parents and friends—are likely to share James Watson’s
views that the choice to select a certain embryo which will then be
carried and raised by them is a deeply personal and private choice.223
Doctors and scientists often believe that the permissible uses of PGD
are medical decisions that should be made by doctors qualified to
know the likely outcomes of their decisions.224 And others feel that
the government should step in to prevent those who can—those with
money—from purposely selecting an embryo for unnecessary pur-
poses: to select the gender of their child or to purposely cause their
child to be disabled.225 Regardless of these personal views, under the
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Constitution neither the government nor a woman’s doctor can force
her to implant an embryo that she does not wish to carry.226
This Note has explored the right to privacy, the right to refuse
medical treatment, and the right to exercise control over one’s prop-
erty. All of these fundamental Constitutional rights support the rights
of Deaf parents to use PGD to purposely implant an embryo carrying
the gene for nonsyndromic deafness. Perhaps because our health care
system is not as centralized as those in other countries, our govern-
ment has not chosen to exercise much control over the private use of
PGD.227 But, as the technology of PGD and similar techniques be-
come more refined, less expensive, and more well-known, the gov-
ernment may have to step in to enumerate the rights of the parent.
Without enumeration in United States federal law, movements like
the “Personhood” movement and the anti-abortion movement could
quickly infringe these Constitutional rights.
This Note is not necessarily arguing that a Constitutional
Amendment shouldn’t be made limiting the use of PGD. The pur-
pose of this Note is not to argue the ethics or morality of using PGD
to implant an embryo with the gene for deafness. Regardless of one’s
personal ethics or religious views, the issue discussed in this note—
the issue of permissible uses of PGD—is a legal issue. Whether a
disabled parent should choose to implant a child with a disability is
a different question altogether. As it stands, the Constitution grants
the right of the mother to control which embryos are implanted in
her own womb.228 Barring an amendment to the Constitution, the
United States Federal government and the State governments can-
not prohibit the use of PGD to select an embryo with the gene for
nonsyndromic deafness.
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